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What causes us to vote and what do we get out of it? We 
approach these questions using data on voting and subjective 
well-being (SWB) from a large household panel dataset in the 
UK. We find some evidence that SWB can affect voting 
intention but no evidence that the results of three recent 
elections have any effect on SWB. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Voting in elections has long have been an area of research for political scientists 
and economists. Since Downs (1957), most models of why people vote – and 
what they get out of voting – are based on the assumption of economic agents 
that are rational according to an underlying set of preferences. Despite a great 
deal of work that builds on such models, voting and its consequences for 
individual welfare are still not very well understood (Green and Shapiro, 1994; 
Levine and Palfrey, 2007). Whilst, the relationship between happiness – or 
subjective well-being (SWB) – and voting does not form part of existing formal 
models of voting, its consideration represents one way to develop a greater 
understanding of voting and the impact of elections.  
 
This paper represents the first attempt to identify the causal relationships 
between voting and SWB (for more on possible associations, see Di Tella and 
MacCulloch, 2005). We test whether SWB affects voting intention and whether 
the result of elections affect SWB by using a panel dataset running over the three 
most recent national elections in the United Kingdom (which were all won by 
the Labour Party). The dataset contains information on life satisfaction, which is 
increasingly being used by economists as a measure of SWB (Dolan et al, 2008). 
Ratings of life satisfaction have been validated against neurological evidence 
(Davidson, 2004), physiological evidence (Steptoe et al, 2005), and a range of 
behaviors (e.g. Lyubomirsky et al, 2005). 
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Section two provides an overview on the relevant literature on the determinants 
of voting and how elections affect outcomes. Section three explains the data and 
methodology and section four presents the results. We find that SWB does not 
affect a person’s propensity to vote on its own but we do find that Conservative 
Party supporters with higher life satisfaction are less likely to vote in elections 
than Labour Party supporters. We find no effect of the election result on SWB, 
either for Conservative or Labour supporters. Section five discusses the results 
and the possibility of a focussing illusion (Schkade and Kahneman, 1998), 
whereby we do not think about something (like an election result) anywhere near 
as much as we think we will. 
 
2. Relevant literature and hypotheses  
 
The Downs (1957) model of voting has stimulated a great deal of research (see 
Blais (2000) for a review). The model suggests that voting is costly to each 
individual, that no individual voter obtains direct utility from the act of voting 
itself, and that the benefits to society from the vote are discounted by the 
probability of casting a decisive vote. While it has been found that the potential 
decisiveness of the vote matters in large elections (Rosenthal and Sen, 1973; 
Silberman and Durden, 1975) and experimental settings (Levine and Palfrey, 
2007), this result is not unequivocal (Ashenfelter and Kelly, 1975).  
 
Importantly, the model significantly under-predicts the number of people that 
vote in elections. Myerson (2000) illustrates the problem of the decisiveness 
model using a Poisson distribution of random voters. He finds that the Electing happiness 
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probability of voting pivotally for one candidate is 8.1x10
-9, i.e. the benefit to a 
voter who prefers a candidate must be more than eight billion times greater than 
the cost to vote. If it costs $10 to vote in an election, then the expected benefits 
of electing one’s preferred candidate must be greater than $80 billion. 
Extensions to the Downs model suggest that people obtain direct consumption 
benefits from voting due to civic duty (Opp, 2001), which may provide its own 
contagion effect to vote (Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). Social norms can 
increase voter turnout (Gerber et al, 2008) and the media can also play an 
important part (Gerber et al, 2009).  
 
There has been some work analysing the psychological reasons behind why and 
how people vote in large elections e.g. cognitive dissonance (Mullainathan and 
Washington, 2009). Such evidence suggests that act of voting strengthens future 
opinions of a candidate i.e. those who are induced to turnout show increased 
polarization in their views toward the candidates two years post-election. Such 
cognitive dissonance can have an effect on a person’s propensity to vote and 
means that we need to be cautious in assuming that there is a causal link 
between individuals’ attitudes and their voting preference. It has also been 
shown that framing effects, which should be irrelevant to people’s voting 
preferences, do indeed affect preferences. For instance, Shue and Luttmer (2008) 
provide an account of how the actual ballot layout can affect people’s 
preferences in the presence of non-negligible voting costs. While such factors 
may shape an individual’s propensity to vote, there have been no studies 
examining how SWB affects the propensity to vote.  
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The research examining the impacts of voting (or an election) has used 
economic outcomes. For instance, Alesina and Roubini (1992) find evidence that 
there are electoral cycles on the inflation rate for a range of countries. For the 
U.S., there are mixed results on the effect of elections on economic outcomes. 
Grogan (1994), Knight (2000), and Besley and Case (2003) find an impact of 
elections on fiscal outcomes, and Snowberg et al (2007) find an effect on 
monetary outcomes. On the other hand, Lee et al (2004) show that voters elect 
policies proposed by the parties instead of affecting the policy positions of the 
parties, and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) find that the outcome of mayor 
elections in major U.S. cities does not affect size of city government, the 
allocation of public resources, property, and crime rates.  
 
Some work has considered subjective assessments of welfare. Radcliff (2001) 
found that SWB is positively affected by left-wing governments i.e. liberal 
political systems, whereas – and somewhat contradictorily – Bjørnskov et al 
(2007) found that excessive government spending has detrimental effects on 
country aggregated SWB. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) find that when the 
government leans more to the right ideologically, right-wing individuals have 
higher SWB and left-wing individuals have lower SWB. Napier and Jost (2008) 
confirm this result although they attribute it to the fact that right-wingers are 
better able to justify income inequalities. Stutzer and Frey (2006) provide 
evidence from Switzerland to suggest that the opportunity to engage directly in 
the democratic process through referenda increases life satisfaction although 
Dorn et al (2007) have cast doubt on the robustness of this finding.  
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The main problem with all of these studies – and many in the voting literature 
more generally – is that they rely on cross-sectional data, suffer from potentially 
serious specification errors and selection effects and cannot establish causality. 
Given the lack of causal work in this area, we approach this important gap in the 
literature by directly examining how SWB can affect individuals’ propensity to 
vote and how elections can affect SWB. More specifically, we aim to test the 
following four hypotheses. First, that SWB has no effect on voting. Second, that 
SWB has no effect on voting allowing for type and strength of political 
affiliation. Third, that there is no effect of the outcome of elections on SWB. 
Fourth, that there is no effect of the outcome of elections on SWB allowing for 
type and strength of political affiliation 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which covers the 
1997, 2001 and 2005 general elections in the UK. The BHPS begun in 1991 and 
is a nationally representative sample of British households, which contains over 
10,000 adult individuals. The entire sample of the unbalanced panel contains 
30,336 observations (17,206 individuals). Of those, 4,197 stayed in all waves 
from wave 6 onwards (this is the first wave SWB ratings were elicited). The 
interviews for the BHPS take place between September and December of every 
year, and the general elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005 were in May, June and 
May respectively. So, the wave before an election is roughly six to nine months 
before and the wave after the election is roughly three to six months after the 
election has taken place. The SWB rating in the BHPS is based on a life Electing happiness 
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satisfaction question: “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life 
overall?”; with seven possible response categories ranging from “1. very 
dissatisfied” to “7. very satisfied”.  
 
3.1 Methodology for hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
To examine people’s propensity to vote in a general election, we use a linear-
probability random effects model: 
     
it i t
bk
it k k it it a b
a
it a a it it x LS P P LS V ε ν θγ δ ϕ φ β α + + + + × + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ , , , ) (  (1) 
 
where i indicates the individuals, t indicates the time, V is the individual’s 
propensity to vote, LS is the individual’s life satisfaction, P is the person’s party 
affiliation,  x is a set of k explanatory variables related to people’s voting 
behavior, and ε is the error term. The interaction term (Pa,it × LSit) will enable us 
to determine whether a person’s political affiliation interacted with life 
satisfaction affects the propensity to vote. We allow for time fixed effects,  t γ , 
and individual random effects,  i ν . The inclusion of time fixed effects controls 
for yearly changes that are the same for all individuals (e.g. economic growth). 
The inclusion of the random effects allows for unobserved characteristics that 
are different for each person but constant over time (e.g. optimism).  
 
The error term, it ε , is assumed to be random and not correlated with the 
observable explanatory variables. For the case of the individual random effects, Electing happiness 
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this seems a rather strong assumption, as it implies that unobserved personality 
traits, such as optimism and extraversion, are not correlated with voting 
preferences and life satisfaction. Therefore, we use the Mundalk (1978) 




i i j j i z ω λ ν ,         ( 2 )  
 
where ωi is the pure error term (not correlated with observables), and zj,it is a 
subset of observables which is correlated with the error term. The correlation 
between the subset of observables and the individual random effects is  , j i z λ , 
where  j z is the average of zj over time. In this case, λ is a statistical correction 
factor, and if this is interpreted as the correlation between unobservable random 
effects and some of the explanatory variables, then the fixed and the random 
effect models give rise to similar results (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). So 
incorporating equation (2) into (1) gives: 
 
Vit =α + βLSit + φaPa,it
a




∑ +θγt + λ jz j,i +ωi
j
∑ +εit, (3)
   
where j z here includes the average voting preferences and life satisfaction over 
time. Using fixed effects here would be infeasible since a significant proportion 
of the voting population do not change their political allegiance. So the first 
hypothesis suggests that SWB has no effect on voting behavior i.e. β = 0. The 
second hypothesis suggests that this relationship is not mediated by type and 
strength of party affiliation i.e. ϕ  = 0. ‘Strong’ support is defined as those Electing happiness 
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individuals who stay loyal to their party throughout the panel, i.e. partisans, and 
‘weak’ support is defined as those individuals who do not stay loyal to their 
party i.e. non-partisans. This also enables us to control for habit-forming 
preferences (Gerber et al, 2003). The k set of x explanatory variables include 
variables that have been found to affect the propensity to vote e.g. sex, age, 
education and household income and regional effects (Johnston et al, 2005). 
 
3.2 Methodology for hypotheses 3 and 4 
 
To test whether the election affects SWB, we use a simple random effects 
model. Since the dependent variable is the life satisfaction variable, the average 
life satisfaction over time is not included as an error-correction term. For the 
third hypothesis, we would have the simple differences-in-differences model, 
which examines whether the election improves SWB: 
 
LSit =α + β1Vi + β2Tt+1 + β3(Vi ×Tt+1)+ δkxk,it +εit
k
∑      (4) 
 
where  Vi is a dummy variable which is unity if the individual votes in the 
general election at time t and Tt+1 is a dummy variable which is unity for the 
wave after the general election takes place. So for H3, we test whether β3 = 0. 
For the fourth, hypothesis, we would have the equivalent of a difference-in-
difference-in-differences model:  
 
LSitv =α + θa
a
∑ Pa,i + β1Tt+1 + ψb(Pa,i ×Tt+1)
b
∑ + δkxk,it +εit
k
∑ ,  v = 1,0  (5) Electing happiness 
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So we run two partial regressions, where we examine those who vote (v = 1) and 
those who do note vote (v  = 0). This is equivalent to extending a further 
interaction effect to equation 4. The fourth hypothesis suggests that voting in the 
last election has not effect on SWB allowing for political party preference, i.e. 
ψb = 0. The k set of x explanatory variables included are those already found to 
affect life satisfaction from the literature e.g. sex, age, education, marital status, 
employment status, number of people in the household and household income 
(Dolan et al, 2008). 
 
4. Results  
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the expected turnout for each election is higher in 
the BHPS than the actual turnout. It might be that respondents in the BHPS are 
more inclined to act pro-socially and/or that they simply over-estimate their 
likelihood of voting but we cannot test for the relative weight of these 
possibilities. Table 2 breaks down the BHPS sample and the electorate for the 
three largest political parties. From 1997 to 2005, the representativeness of the 
BHPS in terms of the electorate has declined. We appreciate that these data are 
not perfectly representative of the British electorate but it represents the best 
dataset available to conduct longitudinal analysis at the national level on the 
relationship between SWB and voting intention and between elections and 
SWB. 
 
4.1 Does SWB affect elections? Electing happiness 
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Table 3 shows the various regressions for all those in the BHPS prior to the 
1997, 2001 and 2005 general elections. Regression 3.1 gives the raw correlation 
between life satisfaction and propensity to vote, which is positive and significant 
– a one-point increase in life satisfaction is associated with a 2% increase in the 
propensity to vote. However, in regression 3.2, life satisfaction becomes 
insignificant once we control for the background variables that are associated 
with the propensity to vote. Whilst not the focus of this paper, it is worth nothing 
that the effect of past (perhaps habit-related) voting is greater than the effect of 
other variables. Overall, then, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that SWB 
does not affect voting.  
 
What about when we account for political preferences? Regression 3.3 shows 
that SWB does not affect the propensity to vote, although Labour and Liberal 
Democrat supporters were more likely to say that they intended to vote. From 
regression 3.4, when political preference is interacted with SWB, we find that 
Conservative supporters with higher SWB are less likely to say that they intend 
to vote. To test, whether this result holds for partisanship, Regression 3.5 uses 
the partisan voters only and shows that SWB does not affect the voting 
intentions of partisans. Regression 3.6 uses the non-partisan voters only and 
shows that ‘weak’ Conservatives are less likely to vote in the next election and 
that ‘weak’ Labour supporters are more likely to vote in the next election. 
Overall, we can reject hypothesis two: overall, happy Conservative are less 
intent on voting. 
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4.2 Do elections affect SWB?  
 
Table 4 shows the various regressions that test hypothesis three. Unfortunately, 
the life satisfaction question was not asked in 2001 and so we cannot conduct a 
difference-in-differences analysis for this election. Regressions 4.1 and 4.2 
present the random effects generalized least squares model to see whether the 
elections of 1997 and 2005 had any effect on SWB. Whilst the variables 
expected to affect SWB behave in the expected ways, voting in the previous 
election does not appear to have any effect on SWB.  
 
What about when we account for political preferences? Table 5 splits the sample 
by those who voted and those who did not and also by strength of support. 
Regressions 5.1 and 5.2 show the results for the 1997 election for ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ supporters, respectively. The 1997 election had no effect on the SWB on 
either set of supporters – not even on the strong Labour supporters, whose party 
had been out of power for 18 years. Regressions 5.5 to 5.8 are analogous results 
for the 2005 election. This time, there are some odd results: non-partisan Labour 
voters reported significantly (but only marginally) lower SWB and those who 
had no political preference had higher SWB after the election. Overall, the 
election results do not appear to affect SWB very much at all but these odd 
results mean that, strictly speaking, we should reject hypothesis four.  
 
5. Discussion  
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We have shown that life satisfaction does not in itself affect the propensity to 
vote in the UK, but that, when linked with political affiliation, Conservatives 
with higher SWB are less likely to vote. This suggests that there might 
something to be gained by models of voting from the incorporation of SWB. Of 
course, our results may be peculiar to the UK and to the measure of SWB we 
used. In particular, it is still an open question whether mood on the day of the 
election is an important determinant of the propensity to vote and the voting 
preference. Furthermore, we have not examined whether SWB could change 
voting preferences altogether (see Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) and 
Washington (2008) for recent examinations of why people change their political 
preferences).   
 
We also showed that the last three elections in the UK have not in themselves 
affect life satisfaction and, when linked to political affiliation, they produce 
some odd results which suggest that elections generally have no effect on SWB. 
These results are consistent with the literature on affective forecasting. In 
general, it seems that we a tendency to overestimate the intensity and especially 
the duration of our reaction to events. For example, Gilbert et al (1998) asked 
voters in Texas during the 1990 election for governor (which was won by 
George W. Bush) how they would feel one month after the election if their 
candidate had lost. Respondents expected to feel miserable but when asked how 
they felt one month later, they were as happy whether their candidate had won or 
lost. Similar results have been found across other contexts that range from 
kidney dialysis (Riis et al, 2005) to housing assignments (Dunn et al, 2003). 
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One explanation for our defective forecasting is the focusing effect (Schkade 
and Kahneman, 1998; Wilson et al, 2000) whereby we over-estimate how much 
we will think about an event in the future. The very nature of thinking about 
something actually makes it appear more important than it will probably turn out 
to be. Many individuals may believe that the outcome of the election will affect 
them for much longer than it actually does because they imagine thinking about 
the election much more than they do. 
 
While our results are informative, there are obvious shortcomings. We limit 
ourselves to the last three general elections in the UK, which were all won by the 
Labour Party and there were no real surprises in the results. The analysis should 
be extended to other countries, to local elections and, in particular, to elections 
where the outcomes are much less certain. Until further results become 
available, we suggest that the last three elections in the UK really have had little 
effect in themselves on SWB. The impact of the policies of the government over 
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Table 1: Comparing intended voting turnout (in the BHPS) versus actual turnout  
 
Turnout  Projected before election  
from BHPS*  Actual official turnout 
1997 General election  82%  71% 
2001 General election  75%  59% 
2005 General election  73%  61% 





















1997 55.8%  43.2%  26.7%  30.7%  13.1% 16.8% 
2001 47.9%  40.7%  20.5%  31.7%  12.0% 18.3% 
2005   36.5%  35.3%  21.6%  32.3%  14.7%  22.1% Electing happiness 
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Table 3: Linear-probability random effects model of the propensity to vote in the 1997, 2001 and 
2005 United Kingdom general elections  
 
  (3.1)  (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) 
  All  All All All  Strong  Weak 
  
Vote in the GE 
t+1  
Vote in the GE 
t+1 
Vote in the GE 
t+1 
Vote in the GE 
t+1  
Vote in the GE 
t+1  
Vote in the GE 
t+1  
Life  satisfaction  0.019  0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.009 
  [0.002]**  [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005]  [0.004]* 
Conservatives party affiliation     -0.018  0.032 0.004 0.069 
      [0.007]**  [0.026] [0.034] [0.036] 
Lib Dems party affiliation      -0.012 0.011 -0.077 0.053 
      [0.008] [0.032] [0.056] [0.039] 
Other party affiliation      -0.042 -0.051 -0.050 -0.041 
      [0.009]**  [0.028] [0.038] [0.039] 
No  preference        -0.255 -0.235 -0.513 -0.186 
      [0.008]** [0.027]** [0.055]** [0.033]** 
Missing/refused/don’t  know      -0.059 -0.059 0.116 -0.036 
      [0.009]**  [0.031] [0.124] [0.036] 
Conservatives x Life satisfaction        -0.009  0.000  -0.016 
       [0.005]*  [0.006]  [0.007]* 
Lib Dems x Life satisfaction        -0.004  0.015  -0.011 
        [0.006] [0.010] [0.007] 
Other party x Life satisfaction        0.002  0.002  -0.003 
        [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] 
No preference  x Life satisfaction        -0.004  -0.011  -0.006 
        [0.005] [0.010] [0.006] 
Missing/refused/don’t know x Life 
satisfaction       0.000  -0.050  -0.003 
       [0.006]  [0.023]*  [0.007] 
Vote in the last GE?    0.399  0.331  0.331  0.270**  0.326 
    [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**  [0.011]  [0.007]** 
Not eligible to vote in the last GE    0.201  0.164  0.164  0.169**  0.157 
    [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.012]**  [0.023]  [0.015]** 
Regional  dummies  (20)  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  dummies  (2)  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Background variables (22)
1 No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  30,336  29,370 29,370 29,370  8,982  20,388 
Number of individuals  17,206  16,856  16,856  16,856  5,560  11,327 
R
2  overall  0.01  0.31 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.31 
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
1 Background variables included in 
these regressions are: sex, age, age
2, education (7), employment status (9), log of household income, 
averaged life satisfaction and average voting preferences (i.e. Mundalk transformation). The political 
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Table 4: The effect of the election on life satisfaction (LS) – random effects generalized least 
squares 
          (4.1)                (4.2)      (4.3)              (4.4)       (4.5)             (4.6) 
   All Strong  (partisan)  Weak 














Vote in the last election  0.081  0.079  0.076  0.105  0.085  0.066 
 [0.036]*  [0.023]**  [0.082]  [0.048]*  [0.040]*  [0.027]* 
Election year dummy  -0.011  -0.109  -0.049  -0.115  0.001  -0.102 
 [0.037]  [0.021]**  [0.084]  [0.047]*  [0.042]  [0.024]** 
Vote in the last election x Election 
year 0.000  0.024  0.049  0.050  -0.014  0.004 
  [0.042]  [0.026]  [0.092] [0.052] [0.047] [0.031] 
Regional dummies (20)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Background variables (31)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 16,745  26,010  4,384  9,389  12,361  16,621 
R
2  overall  0.08  0.09  0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
1 Background variables included in 
these regressions are: sex, age, age
2, education (7), marital status (10), employment status (9), household 
size, and the log of household income. The political reference group is the Labour party. We also include a 
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        (5.1)                  (5.2)       (5.3)             (5.4)       (5.5)              (5.6)       (5.7)             (5.8) 
  Voted in the GE  Not voted in the GE  Voted in the GE  Not voted in the GE 
  Strong  Weak  Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak 


















Conservatives party affiliation  0.279 0.084  0.317  0.336  0.070 0.058 -0.189 0.121 
  [0.082]** [0.042]* [0.268]  [0.130]**  [0.058] [0.048] [0.181] [0.100] 
Lib Dems party affiliation  -0.008  -0.034 0.317  0.130  -0.047  0.052 -0.138 -0.037 
  [0.107]  [0.055]  [0.370] [0.169] [0.083] [0.047] [0.255] [0.109] 
Other party affiliation  0.127  -0.161  -0.427 -0.273 0.004 -0.050 0.048 0.024 
  [0.231]  [0.095]  [0.568] [0.193] [0.081] [0.051] [0.162] [0.093] 
No preference  0.583  -0.154  0.249  0.136  0.520  -0.038  -0.214  -0.020 
  [0.648]  [0.085]  [0.223] [0.106] [0.497] [0.071] [0.137] [0.070] 
Missing/refused/don’t know   0.253  -0.139  0.446  0.507  -0.127  0.011  -0.054  0.129 
  [0.276]  [0.061]* [0.529]  [0.154]**  [0.202] [0.048] [0.283] [0.081] 
Election year dummy  0.033  -0.021  0.030  0.033  -0.034  -0.073  -0.316  -0.058 
 [0.044]  [0.028]  [0.172]  [0.102]  [0.033]  [0.033]*  [0.110]**  [0.075] 
Conservatives party affiliation x Election year  -0.040 -0.050  -0.285  -0.282 0.008 -0.068 0.218 -0.002 
  [0.077]  [0.046]  [0.309] [0.163] [0.054] [0.052] [0.208] [0.129] 
Lib Dem party affiliation x Election year  -0.048 0.049  -0.299  -0.138  -0.004 -0.054 0.051  0.094 
  [0.101]  [0.062]  [0.452] [0.226] [0.080] [0.054] [0.311] [0.146] 
Other party affiliation x Election year  -0.112 -0.022  0.081  0.690  -0.088 -0.025 0.275 -0.061 
  [0.223]  [0.117]  [0.633]  [0.272]*  [0.048] [0.057] [0.160] [0.117] 
No preference x Election year  -0.399  -0.104  -0.158  0.018  -0.827  -0.014  0.286  -0.043 
  [0.685]  [0.131]  [0.252] [0.132] [0.509] [0.094]  [0.135]*  [0.086] 
Missing/refused/don’t know x Election year  -0.179  0.235  -0.267  -0.263  0.097  0.018  0.167  -0.042 
  [0.272]  [0.082]** [0.560] [0.191] [0.201] [0.060] [0.296] [0.106] 
Regional  dummies  (20)  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  dummies  (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Background  variables  (31)  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,362  9,698  757  2,201  7,233  10,394  1,666  5,656 
R
2  overall  0.12  0.08  0.17 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 